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1 INTRODUCTION
This  paper  summarizes  three  main  technical  contributions  of  our  PhD  project1 entitled
“Security Architecture for Wireless Ad hoc Networks”.  Ad hoc networks are a new paradigm
of wireless communications for wireless hosts or nodes. In an ad hoc network there are is no
supporting infrastructure like base stations, access points or wireless switching centers. An ad
hoc  network  can  be  established  as  soon  as  two  or  more  nodes  are  within  each  other's
transmission range. Nodes within range communicate directly, while nodes further apart rely
on other nodes to relay messages for them. If the nodes in the network are mobile, then the
topology of the network frequently changes. Military operations are still the main application
of ad hoc networks, but civilian applications include smart homes, patient monitoring while
they and the staff roam the hospital, environmental control, etc.
Security is as important in ad hoc networks as it is in more traditional networks like the
Internet.  Sensitive  data  should  be  protected  from  malicious  eavesdroppers  and  network
services should only be provided to eligible users.
1.1 SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AD HOC NETWORKS
Providing adequate security measures for ad hoc networks is a challenging task.
First, wireless communications are easy to intercept and difficult to contain. Next to this it
is easy to actively insert or modify wireless messages. This means that unprotected wireless
networks  are  open  to  a  wide  range  of  attacks,  including  node  impersonation,  message
injection, loss of confidentiality, etc.
Secondly, in many situations the nodes may be left unattended in a hostile environment.
This  enables  adversaries  to  capture  them and  physically  attack  them.  Proper  precautions
(tamper resistance) are required to prevent attackers from extracting secret information from
them.  Even  with  these  precautions,  we  cannot  exclude  that  a  fraction  of  the  nodes  may
become compromised. This enables attacks launched from within the network.
Thirdly, the dynamic topology and the absence of a supporting infrastructure renders most
of the existing cryptographic protocols useless as they were not developed for this dynamic
1  This  work  was  funded  by  a  research  grant  of  the  Flemish  Institute  for  the  Promotion  of  Industrial  Scientific  and
Technological Research (IWT).
environment. Any security solution with a static configuration would not suffice. Security
mechanisms should be able to adapt on-the-fly to these changes in topology.
Fourthly, many wireless nodes will have a limited energy resource (battery, solar panel,
etc.). This is particularly true in the case of ad hoc sensor networks. Security solutions should
be designed with this limited energy budget in mind.
Finally,  an  ad  hoc  network  may consist  of  thousands  of  nodes.  Security  mechanisms
should be scalable to handle such a large network.
2 POWER CONSUMPTION OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES
We  have  evaluated  the  power  consumption  of  different  digital  signature  schemes.  We
compare the computational cost of the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
with the cost of digital signature schemes based solely on efficient symmetric cryptographic
techniques. In these power consumption evaluations, we take into account all aspects of using
these  schemes  in  wireless  environments:  energy consumption  of  key generation,  signing,
verification and the communicational cost of sending and receiving the necessary data (the
signatures themselves, but also the public keys and the necessary data to authenticate these
keys).
The digital signature schemes based on symmetric cryptographic techniques we evaluated
are the Lamport-Diffie one-time signature scheme and the HORS (Hash to Obtain Random
Subset) signature scheme by Reyzin and Reyzin. Both these schemes are one-time signature
schemes, meaning that the private key can only be used once to create a signature. Therefore,
in order to make these schemes practical, an efficient authentication mechanism for the public
keys is required. We have evaluated the cost of two authentication mechanisms: Merkle trees
and one-way chains. Summarizing our results we can say that (1) one-way chains are most
efficient for signature verification, (2) ECDSA and both one-time schemes using Merkle trees
are most efficient for signature generation, and (3) ECDSA is the best candidate concerning
communicational cost (due to the short signatures and the fact that the private key can be used
multiple times). We also conclude that the most demanding task is signature generation, then
verification and finally communications.
3 DYNAMIC KEY MANAGEMENT
We have developed a key management scheme for dynamic ad hoc networks. Our scheme
builds on existing key pre-distribution schemes in order to bootstrap the process. A key pre-
distribution  scheme distributes  a  set  of  secret  keys in  every node  before  these  nodes  are
deployed in the field. Once the nodes are deployed, the pre-distribution scheme can provide
guarantees of two nodes sharing a secret key with a particular fraction of its neighbors (this
fraction is one of the parameters of the key pre-distribution scheme). In our scheme, the first
step is to enlarge this fraction by using trust relationships (node A has shares a key with B,
Figure 1: Example ad hoc network. Illustrates (1) Node A moving through
the network, and (2) cooperative signing of a message res to the query node.
and B with C, then A can use B to setup a key with C). This way, a node can establish a
shared secret  key with every node within its  neighborhood.  In order to  make the scheme
dynamic, we trigger this neighborhood discovery process every ΔT milliseconds. As long as
two consecutive neighborhoods of a node overlap, the nodes in this overlap can be used to
establish keys with all the new nodes in the new neighborhood (Fig. 1 shows node A moving
through the network). In order to improve the security of the scheme, we use multiple trusted
paths to establish these shared secrets. We show how our scheme can be build on top of a well
known routing scheme for ad hoc networks: Dynamic Source Routing (DSR); and how DSR
itself can be secured using the keys established with our scheme. Finally, we have evaluated
the total overhead of our scheme using a network simulator we have written in Java.
4 EFFICIENT GROUP AUTHENTICATION
We propose a mechanisms that allows query nodes in a sensor network to securely pull data
from the sensor nodes. Two important issues are tackled in this work: (1) multiple nodes have
to cooperate in order to digitally sign a message, and (2) only efficient operations are required
(at least for the low-power sensor nodes).
The  RSA public  key cryptosystem comes  in  two  flavors:  a  signature  scheme and  an
encryption scheme. Both algorithms require a private key and a corresponding public key. In
order to sign a document, one uses his private key (known only to the signer). Other users can
verify the signature using the corresponding public key (publicly available). For encryption
the use of keys is inversed: in order to encrypt a message, one uses the recipients public key,
while the recipient uses his private key to decrypt the cryptogram. In both cases the public
operation (signature verification and encryption) is very efficient, while the private operation
is  rather  inefficient  .  In  our  scheme  the  sensor  nodes  only  have  to  perform  the  public
operations.
In order to support authentication from the nodes to the query node, we have adapted an
existing  one-time  signature  scheme.  This  adapted  scheme  (based  on  efficient  symmetric
cryptographic  algorithms)  enables  multiple  nodes  to  cooperatively  sign  (authenticate)  a
message. Figure 1 shows how the nodes in cell A cooperate to sign a response to the query
node. The manager node (black) transmits the encrypted response, while the other nodes in the
cell transmit a partial signature on this response. Our design is flexible in that it allows some
partial signatures to be lost or corrupted and still provide a valid signature on the message. It
also allows to  reconfigure the group size of  the nodes that  cooperate  to  sign a  message.
Finally, in our scheme the nodes actually divide the load of signing a message, i.e., a partial
signature requires less effort than signing a complete message.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have summarized three techniques that were developed during the course of
our PhD project “Security Architecture for Wireless Ad hoc Networks”. This PhD project
focuses on providing security in the highly dynamic and power-restrained environment of
wireless  ad  hoc  networks.  A first  contribution  evaluates  power  consumption  of  different
digital signature schemes, next we present a dynamic key management scheme and finally we
propose a novel authentication scheme.
